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Knowledge, Identity, and the Politics of Law
Margaret Davies and Nan Seuffert*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a white lesbian academic in law who has been
asked to participate in a judicial education seminar for state court judges.
One of your areas of specialization is contracts, with a focus on recent
developments in the law of promissory estoppel,' and you will address this
topic. The materials sent to you include the statement that the state is
committed to access to justice for all people. Each presenter is asked to
consider the implications of the law in his or her topic for groups in society
that have historically been the targets of discrimination. You ask yourself,
what are the implications of promissory estoppel for lesbians? You suspect
the "lesbian community" no longer exists, if it ever did.2 Who is a lesbian?
What does promissory estoppel have to do with access to justice? You feel
inadequate to discuss promissory estoppel and access to justice with
judges; if you can't imagine where to start with lesbians, what about gay
men? Or Black women recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC)? Or heterosexual white women?
Is it possible for a heterosexual reader of this article to imagine herself
or himself as a white lesbian academic in law?3 Is it possible for a white
* Margaret Davies is Senior Lecturer in Law at the Flinders University of South Australia,
and Nan Seuffert is Senior Lecturer at the University of Waikato. The creative spark for
this project was provided by the Feminist Legal Academic Workshop (F-LAW) held at the
Australian National University in February 1995 where issues relating to feminist
epistemology and pedagogy were discussed generally.
1. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979).
2. Vera Whisman, Identity Crisis: Who is a Lesbian Anyway?, in SISTERS, SEXPERTS,
QUEERS: BEYOND THE LESBIAN NATION 47, 60 (Arlene Stein ed., 1993).
3. See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY 102-09 (1989)
(discussing whether three elderly male judges can imagine themselves pregnant, or imagine
themselves as women). See also DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE IMAGINARY DOMAIN: ABORTION,
PORNOGRAPHY, AND SEXUAL HARAsSMENT (1995) (discussing imaginary domain and sexual
privacy).
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woman to imagine herself as a black woman? What does identity mean
and how is one's identity formed? How are politics constituted and what is
the relationship between politics and identity? What are the implications of
situating knowledges for identity politics? What are the relationships
between situated knowledges, 4 identity politics and law? Since law is
central to a particular type of identity formation, exemplifies a particular
type of knowledge and is a site of much feminist activism, the continuation
of feminist legal analysis is absolutely vital. In this article we reconsider
some of the recent feminist work on knowledge and identity, focusing
especially on the interrelationships of knowledge, identity and law.
Traditionally, the relationship between the production of knowledge
and power has been masked and legitimated by the concept of objectivity,
which has been central to mainstream Western epistemology. 6 Feminist
and other critiques of the objectivity of knowledge have exposed this
relationship, revealing that objectivity in its conventional sense is not
logically possible, and that knowledge is political and contextual.
Knowledge is therefore located in the particular cultural, linguistic,
institutional, geographical and political contexts of the knower.
The feminist project of situating knowledge means considering the
contexts of the knower. We are feminists and activists who were educated
in the geographical centers of the first and second waves of feminism, and
academics in some of the geographical margins of mainstream feminism.
We live and work in Australia and Aotearoa/New Zealand, where
colonization is an ongoing issue and the use of the term "postcolonial" is
debated. Maori women in New Zealand have challenged the importation
of North American feminist theories and insisted on the validity of the
production of knowledges which are incommensurate and inconsistent with
both mainstream and postmodern feminist. epistemologies." Some
4. See generally WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE
MODERNIrY 52-76 (1995).
5. Michel Foucault's book, Power/Knowledge (1980), is often credited with the
development of the idea that networks of power define truth. The idea was not, however,
without its precedents, as de Beauvoir's thought illustrates. See Introduction to SIMONE DE
BEAuVOiR, THE SECOND SEX (MM Parshley trans., 1953) (1949).
6. In part, this derives from the centrality of scientific positivism to mainstream Western
thinking. Positivism, originally developed by Auguste Comte, is based on the idea that there
are facts about the physical world which are ascertainable in a culturally-neutral fashion.
See generally AUGUSTE COMTE, THE PosrrivE PHILOsOPHY (1974).
7. See, eg., Patricia Johnston & Leonie Pihama, What Counts as Difference and What
Differences Count: Gender, Race and the Politics of Difference, in Tol WAHINE: THE
WORLDS OF MAORI WOMEN 75, 84 (Kathie Irwin & Irihapeti Ramsden eds., 1995) ("[We
avoid using the term post-colonial as we believe that this country remains very much
colonial."); Sneja Gunew, Multicultural Multiplicities: US, Canada, Australia, in
CULTURAL STUDY, PLURALISM & THEORY 51, 61-62 (D. Bennett ed., 1993) (arguing that
postcolonialism focuses on differences between white settlers and indigenous people,
constituting 'migrants' as a passing phase).
8. See Johnson & Pihama, supra note 7, at 84-85.
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feminists in Australia and Aotearoa/New Zealand therefore question the
utility of North American feminist theory,9 and critically recycle and
recreate it into local tools.10
Situating knowledge also highlights the process of identity formation
as integral to knowledge production. The concept of identity, like the
concept of objectivity, has recently been the subject of much feminist
theoretical debate." Many early mainstream feminists seem to have relied
largely on the assumption that all women share an essential identity, or
some common core of existence, while at the same time disputing the
traditional dominant views of what was contained in that common core.
12
Postmodern feminists, queer theorists and others have rejected the concept
of essentialism and embraced radical social constructionist 13 concepts of
identity.14 Social constructionists in the postmodern tradition argue that
subjects are constructed relationally through a variety of, discursive
practices. Our identities are culturally mapped by a series of discourses,
some of which are more fluid than others. The dominant discourses are
sometimes congealed, limiting our creative efforts at reconstruction. The
resistant and subversive discourses, which operate in the gaps and
interstices of the dominant discourses, are more fluid. Therefore our
identity arises in response to a number of sometimes conflicting factors,
including the identities imposed upon us by the dominant discourses, as
well as those which are an attempt to mediate, resist or recreate those
dominant discourses. The result is a complex identity.. situated sometimes
on the fringes and sometimes closer to the center of mainstream
productions.
This article explores both the dominant constructions and the critiques
of the relationships between situated knowledges, identity politics and law.
We also consider the strategic use of law to further specific political claims.
9. See generally Larissa Behrendt, Aboriginal Women and the White Lies of the
Feminist Movement: Implications for Aboriginal Women in Rights Discourse, 1
AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST L.J. 27 (1993).
10. See Nan Seuffert, Circumscribing Knowledge in AotearoaoNew Zealand: Just
Epistemology, 1 YEARBOOK OF NEW ZEALAND JURISPRUDENCE 97, 117 (1997); Vicky Kirby,
'Feminisms, Reading, Postmodernisms': Rethinking Complicity, in FEMINISM AND THE
POLITICs OF DIFFERENCE 20,21 (Sneja Gunew & Anna Yeatman eds., 1993); Wendy Lamer,
Theorising Difference in Aotearoal New Zealand, 2(2) GENDER, PLACE AND CULTURE 177,
182-84 (1995).
11. See, e.g., ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN
FEMINISTTHOUGHT 185, 186-87 (1988).
12. See KATE MILLET, SEXUAL PoLITICS 26-36 (1970); ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST
POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE 28 (1983).
13. See, e.g., EMILE BENVENISTE, PROBLEMES DE LNGUISTIQUE GENERALE (1966); JEAN-
FRANAOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE 15 (1984);
DONNA HARAWAY, SIMiANS, CYBOROS, AND WOMEN: THE REINVENTION OF NATURE 184-86
(1991).
14. See JUDrrI BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY
16-25 (1990).
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In Part I of the article, we consider the situated aspects of knowledges and
the implications of situating knowledge for the law. Discarding false
claims of objectivity as legitimators of knowledge raises the issue of how
to value knowledge. We have developed three analytical tools to evaluate
knowledge claims in our project of carving out spaces from the dominant
discourses in law. Situating knowledge focuses attention on the subject
who produces the legal knowledge, which leads us to consideration of
identity formation in Part I. We then consider the interrelationships of
identity and politics, arguing that subjects constantly reproduce their
identities and their politics in relation to contested dominant discourses and
constructions of subversive discourses, simultaneously
reproducing/recreating those dominant and subversive discourses and their
identities and politics. We conclude by arguing that identity, politics,
knowledge and law are all mutually reproductive.
While our geographical location may be seen as marginal to the centers
of Western feminism, we are also white middle-class academics centrally
placed and privileged in relation to knowledge production generally. 15 Our
conscious political stakes in the knowledge that we produce here include
the attempt to carve out space from the dominant constructions of our
identities and of knowledge, for our own creativity in constructing those
identities and producing knowledge. At the same time, we hope to limit
and circumscribe our privilege and leave space for the resistance and
creativity projects of other women. One of the aims of this article is the
consideration of how aspects of our identities, as variously constructed and
imposed upon us by the dominant discourses, and as resisted, recreated and
circumscribed by us, constitute identity politics and relate to knowledge
production and law.
II. SITUATED KNOWLEDGES
Feminist theory has foregrounded the identity of the knowing subject in
its analysis of knowledge, 16 thus overturning the traditional scientific and
liberal assumption that knowledge is not connected to any particular human
identity. However, feminist epistemology has not been purely critical; it
15. See Shane Phelan, Specificity: Beyond Equality and Difference, 3 DIFFERENCES 128,
129 (1991).
16. See HARAWAY, supra note 13; SANDRA HARDING, THE ScIENCE QUESTION IN
FEMINISM 145-46 (1986) [hereinafter TiE SCIENCE QUESTION]; CATHARINE MA-CKINNON,
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF TM STATE 120 (1989). See also JAGGAR, supra note 12, at
ch. 11. See generally GENDER/BODY/KNoWLEDGE: FEMINIST RECONSTRUCTIONS OF BEING
AND KNOWING (Alison M. Jaggar & Susan R. Bordo eds., 1989) [hereinafter
GENDER/BODY/KNOWLEDGE]. In law, the 'identity' of the knower in knowledge production
has been an important element of several challenges to mainstream law, starting with the
legal realists. Realism draws on pragmatist philosophy which emphasizes that knowledge is
based in experience rather than in universal abstractions. See JEROME FRANK, L. w AND TiE
MODERN MIND ch. 5 (1936).
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also provides some guidance on how claims to knowledge can be valued. In
addition to exploring these matters, in this section we will also consider
further our own position in this framework, in particular emphasizing the
limits and limitations of our experiences, perspectives and engagement
with legal discourse.
A. THE CLAIM TO KNOWLEDGE AND FEMINIST CRITIQUES
Western knowledge has traditionally been built upon the premise that
knowledge can be 'objective,' meaning that it emanates from the object,
and that the identity of the human subject who knows is irrelevant to the
knowledge itself.'7 Knowledge is ideally non-political, a description of the
way things are, which is not influenced by the knower's position in society
or political beliefs. Feminist critiques have challenged this model of
knowledge in a variety of ways, which we will outline in this section. In an
effort to focus upon some of the more pragmatic political directions for
feminist legal activism, we we will first discuss standpoint theory. Our aim
is not so much to defend its philosophical foundations, but rather to
consider how it may provide a useful springboard in critiquing law and
encouraging the law's progression toward multiple vision.
1. Feminist Epistemology: An Outline
In considering feminist epistemology, we will focus on the work of
Sandra Harding and Donna Haraway, both of whom have written on the
topic of scienctific knowledge. Discussion of scientific knowledge is of
relevance to law because of the insistence of both discourses on value-
neutrality.
According to Harding, there have been three basic approaches to 'the
science question in feminism': feminist empiricism, feminist standpoint
theory, and feminist postmodemism. In Harding's taxonomy, "feminist
empiricism" is the attempt by feminist scientists and social scientists to
demonstrate that certain areas of traditional science have suffered from
male bias, and therefore do not live up to the standards of neutrality and
objectivity which science demands. 19 Feminist empiricism can be
compared to the liberal feminist approach, which accepts the basic
premises of the prevailing ideology, but argues that its own standards need
17. See Lorraine Code, Taking Subjectivity into Account, in FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGIES 16
(Linda Alcoff & Elizabeth Potter eds., 1993) (discussing the Western view of knowledge);
Alison M. Jaggar, Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology, in
GENDER/BODY/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 16, at 145-46.
18. See SANDRA HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE?: THINKING FROM
WOMEN'S LivEs ch. 5 (1991) [hereinafter WHOSE SCIENCE?]; HARDING, THE SCIENCE
QUESrION, supra note 16. See also Katherine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 829, 867-880 (1990) (By adding "positionality" to this taxonomy, Bartlett creates
her own synthesis to these approaches.).
19. HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE?, supra note 18, at 111.
Summer 20001
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL
to be more rigorously followed.20 Both approaches have the strategic
advantage of being readily understood and very persuasive in a social
context which values neutrality. 1
Harding's second feminist approach to epistemology is the standpoint
approach. The argument of standpoint epistemology is essentially that an
oppressed person is better able to understand the nature of oppression than
the oppressor. Such an argument is indebted to, among other sources,
Hegel's "master-slave dialectic. ' 22 We will describe standpoint theory in
more detail shortly, but it is important to note at this point that Harding's
claim is that rather than eliminating the standard of objectivity altogether, a
standpoint provides "strong objectivity" rather than "weak objectivity."
"Weak objectivity" is the objectivity of conventional scientific empiricism:
it is "weak" because it "encourages only a partial and distorted
explanation ' 23 of the phenomena it is supposed to describe. Harding argues
that a strengthened standard of objectivity can be obtained by making use
of the "resource" of otherness, by looking "back at the self in all its cultural
particularity from a more distant, critical, objectifying location." 24
In Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Harding also identifies
postmodernist feminism as a third approach to epistemology utilized by
feminist thinkers.2 Postmodernism is anti-foundationalist in the sense that
it interrogates the foundations of theory: typically, for instance, a
deconstruction of a theory would illustrate the ways in which its
foundations are self-contradictory, or reliant upon some term allegedly
26
excluded from the theory. Feminist postmodernism, which is the basis
for the critique of conventional identity politics, has argued that the central
terms upon which feminism itself is based-male and female, masculine
and feminine-are relational, rather than absolute, and that this provides an
opportunity for feminists to challenge at its very foundations the
oppressiveness of sex relations. Because standpoint theory appears to
accept the male/female dichotomy as fixed, seems to assume that
experience and identity are unproblematic and argues for an
epistemological grounding of knowledge, it seems to be fundamentally
opposed to postmodernism.27 However, as Harding has pointed out, there
20. See JAGGAR, supra note 12, at ch. 7.
21. See HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE?, supra note 18, at 113 ("The discourses of objectivity
and of truth/falsity are ancient and powerful. It is a great strength of feminist empiricism
that it can enter and use these widely respected languages and conceptual schemes.").
22. G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT (1977). See also PAL.O FREIRE,
PEDAGOGY OFTHE OPPRESSED 111-19 (1970).
23. HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE?, supra note 18, at 143.
24. Id. at 151.
25. See id. at ch. 7.
26. For prime examples see JACQUES DERRIDA, DISSEMINATION (1981); JACQUES
DERRIDA, PosITIONS (1981); Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundations of
Authority"' 11 CARDozO L. REv. 919, 979-1039 (1990).
27. Many of these criticisms are voiced in BROWN, supra note 4, at 39-43. Brown
[Vol. 11:2
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are also some links between standpoint theory and postmodemism, notably
that standpoint theory is not necessarily essentialist,28 it insists upon the
locatedness of knowledge, does not hold out its results as absolute truth,
does not assume that there are presocial individuals and attempts to use a
particular discourse of 'science' progressively, without claiming that it is
the only science.z9
Haraway has developed an approach to situated knowledge which
attempts to take account of some of these postmodem themes. She argues
that the goal of feminist knowledge is not transcendent or universal
knowledge, but rather a way of understanding the world which allows
connections to be drawn and translations to be made between differently
situated knowledges 0 Haraway reclaims vision as a metaphor for
knowing, emphasizing, however, that our eyes and thus our visions are!
embodied and active, not disembodied receptors, as assumed by the
dominant discourse on vision as knowing.1 She also stresses the
responsibility involved in knowing: science (like law) has traditionally
attempted to escape any responsibility for its knowledge, in its arrogant
assumption that individual people are detached from the vision produced.
Situated knowledge, for Haraway, is responsible knowledge, because
people are required to take into account their own position in the web of
social constructions. Importantly for our purposes, Haraway refutes any
suggestion that situated knowledge relies upon an 'innocent' or unmediated
knowing agent: "The positionings of the subjugated are not exempt from
critical re-examination, decoding, deconstruction, and interpretation."
32
Interestingly, Haraway also argues for a feminist 'objectivity' but is
perhaps more specific than Harding about what this might mean, and why
her preferred knowledge is 'objective.' She speaks of "the joining of partial
views and halting voices into a collective subject position": 33 her
'objectivity' is that of subjects who acknowledge that their views are partial
and embodied and who attempt to build connections out of this recognition.
Such a notion of objectivity attempts to bypass the traditional transcendent
objectivity by grounding knowledge in its subjective context, rather than by
appears to conflate standpoint theory with consciousness raising, arguing that both are based
on a simple unmediated subject-position and identity. Although the two feminist approaches
are clearly related, standpoint theory is undoubtedly a more sophisticated tool for achieving
an alternative to mainstream knowledge, and one which has been sensitive to some degree
to developments in postmodern thought. See HARAWAY, supra note 13; HARDING, WHOSE
SCIENCE?, supra note 18, at ch. 5-7.
28. See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
29. This is a very brief and unsatisfactory catalogue of Harding's thoughtful responses to
postmodern ideas. See HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE?, supra note 18, at 181-86.
30. See HARAWAY, supra note 13, at 183-88.
31. See id. at 188.
32. Id. at 191.
33. Id. at 196.
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objectifying the object from a detached stance.34
Both Harding and Haraway therefore retain the terminology of
'objectivity,' but criticize its traditional use. There are certainly some
strategic advantages to retaining the goal of 'objectivity'-in particular that
it appeals so strongly to liberal thinkers, and is therefore a compelling
argumentative tool. However, 'objectivity' also carries with it the risk of
connoting totalization, which may be dangerous in a climate which is
currently questioning the constitution of identity in so many different
ways. In our view it is preferable to discard the terminology of
'objectivity' both because it is simply impossible, and because it is too
enmeshed in conventional notions of a truth which is antithetical to the
subject-position.
2. Epistemology and Law
The traditional view of the objectivity of knowledge is very common in
legal discourse, where an authoritative picture of law, not open to
fundamental challenge, is considered crucial.3 6 Positivist legal theory has
been based on the possibility of describing law as it is, 37 while legal
formalism presumes that there is an objective solution to legally-defined
disputes.38 The dominant view of law is that it can be objectively identified
and applied neutrally. Like traditional scientists, legal theorists and
practitioners have assumed that there is a legal 'view from nowhere.' In
law, as elsewhere, 'perspectives' which are from somewhere, rather than
from the assumed 'nowhere' of the professional white male, are regarded
as inherently biased.
Within this traditional framework, law may be open to appropriate
sorts of challenges. The idea behind liberal law reform is that incremental
changes to the legal system need to be made to keep pace with alterations
in the social environment, but that the system itself is perfectly capable of
overseeing such change in a neutral fashion.39 In other words, internal
34. See id. at 198 ("Situated knowledges require that the object of knowledge be pictured
as an actor and agent, not a screen or a resource, [and] never finally as slave to the master
that closes off the dialectic in his unique agency and authorship of 'objective' knowledge.").
35. See Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 813,
817-18 (1992) (Delgado deconstructs the claim to power which is concealed in the discourse
of 'objectivity.').
36. Much legal theory in the Anglo-American tradition has started from the proposition
that objective knowledge about law is both desirable and possible. So, while H.L.A. Hart
and earlier positivists sought a fundamental principle which would justify or legitimate all
law, Ronald Dworkin (while rejecting positivism) has argued that there is a single best
answer to legal disputes. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW ch. 6 (1961); RONALD
DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 225-75 (1986).
37. See HART, supra note 36; HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 116,
163,438 (1961).
38. See E. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law 97 YALE L.J.
949, 953-55 (1987).
39. It is this concept of benign liberalism which appears to underlie Ronald Dworkin's
[Vol. 11:2
KNOWLEDGE
criticism based on acceptance of fundamental legal ideals, including the
ideal of objectivity, is generally acceptable within the system, while a
challenge to the basic premises of law and legal objectivity is not.
Many feminist critiques of law are essentially an applied feminist
epistemology. Feminists have argued that legal 'objectivity' is neither truly
objective, nor apolitical. For instance, reasonableness is not an objective
test because it presupposes a particular kind of legal subject, one modeled
on the "benchmark man.''4 Some feminist critiques of legal objectivity
have argued that changing the content of legal knowledge would result in
standards which are more objective, a standard which is inclusive of
women's experience and knowledge as well as that of men.4' Such
arguments are analogous to the feminist critiques of masculine bias in
science and in the social sciences. Other critiques have focused on the
artificiality of the objective/subjective distinction in law. Catharine
MacKinnon, for instance, has argued very persuasively that the so-called
'objective' position is necessarily assumed by a subject and is in reality
only a method of protecting a privileged point of view.42
B. VALUING KNOWLEDGE
Recognizing the situated aspects of knowledge dispels the illusion of
objectivity,43 leaving us to focus on the question of how different claims to
knowledge should be valued. The need to focus on the value of knowledge
arises for the simple reason that the critique of objectivity often leads to the
counterintuitive and apolitical assertion that logically no knowledge can be
more valuable than any other.44 If knowledge is always located, never
transcending its own context, then each perspective is as good as any other.
And if that is the case, the argument goes, we have lost any hope of
grounding our political action.45 Where Marxism and liberalism have each
view of law as "integrity." See DWORKIN, supra note 36, at 95-96.
40. The literature on reasonableness as an 'objective' legal standard has become
extensive in the past decade. Several works remain enormously influential. See, e.g., Leslie
Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 20-25
(1988); Lucinda Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts
Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 57-65 (1989).
41. See the discussion in AN ETHIC OF CARE: FEMINIST AND INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECnVES (Mary Jeanne Larabee ed., 1993).
42. See CATHARINE MAcKiNNON, FEMmISM UNMODIFIED 55 (1987).
43. Or at least it dispels what Sandra Harding calls "weak objectivity," in WHOSE
SCIENCE?, supra note 18. Harding's "strong objectivity" is the objectivity of situatedness.
Id. As we have indicated, we would prefer for political reasons to abandon this terminology
as far as possible.
44. For instance, see the comments made by Joseph Ellin in Liberalism, Radicalism,
Muddlism: Comments on Some New Ways of Thinking About Legal Questions, in RADICAL
CRITIQUES OFTHE LAW 215 (S. Griffin & R. Moffat eds., 1997).
45. This has been one of the greatest anxieties about postmodem critical stances. Two
points can be made about this claim. First, that the deconstruction of fundamental ethical
concepts does not necessarily imply that they are politically or morally useless. This is only
the case if it is assumed that a theory must have a solid and non-contradictory foundation
Summer 2000]
in their way given us a solid ideological ground upon which to base
political action, contemporary critiques of knowledge appear to dispel any
such possibility.
However, the assumption that valuing (false) claims of objectivity
provides protection from relativism and/or nihilism is flawed. In the first
place, all knowledge has always been situated and therefore valuing
knowledge that falsely claims the objectivity of a 'view from nowhere'
provides at best a deceptive protection against nihilism and relativism.
Critiques of mainstream knowledge production expose the fact that in the
end it is nothing but power which holds the dominant ideology in place.
46
The argument which would reduce the critique of absolute knowledge to
equal but competing 'perspectives' ignores the power relationships which
underlie existing dominant knowledges, as well as the fact that in order to
undermine these systems of power it is necessary in the first place to value
knowledges which subvert them.47 Furthermore, insofar as it claims that
there are no criteria for preferring one foundation for knowledge to any
other, the relativist argument itself implies a view from nowhere. As
Haraway argues, relativism "is a way of being nowhere while claiming to
be everywhere equally. The 'equality' of positioning is a denial of
responsibility and critical inquiry."''4
Bearing these comments in mind, we would like to outline three
methods of valuing knowledge, two of which are drawn from existing
feminist work in the area, and one of which is perhaps more novel, at least
in this context. These three criteria for valuing an understanding of the
world are: first, the acknowledgment of situatedness, second, the 'epistemic
privilege' of the view from below, and third, consideration of the purely
strategic value of knowledge. Our claim is not that these methods of
evaluation are necessarily more logically grounded than any other, but
rather that they are defensible on political grounds.4 9
before it can have any political purchase. Secondly, insofar as it refuses to accept
uncritically conventional assumptions, postmodem thought is itself revealed as having a
political edge. See generally DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION: ETHICAL
FEMINISM, DECONSTRUCTION, AND THE LAW (1991); COSTAS DOUZINAS AND RONNIE
WARRINGTON, POSTMODERN JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW OF TEXT IN THE TEXTS OF LAW
(1991); DERRIDA, supra note 26.
46. See MARGARET DAVIES, DELIMrlNG THE LAW: 'POSTMODERNISM' AND THE POIMCS
OF LAW 13-38 (1996); Drucilla Cornell, The Violence of the Masquerade: Law Dressed Up
as Justice, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1047, 1047-64 (1991); DERRIDA, supra note 26.
47. See Ellin, supra note 44.
48. HARAWAY, supra note 13, at 191.
49. Wendy Brown puts a challenge to feminists to be prepared to adopt political rather
than truth-based grounds for assuming critical positions. BROWN, supra note 4, at ch. 2. In
some ways our work is one way of responding to that challenge.
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1. Valuing Situation
First, as Haraway suggests,5 ° we might value knowledge claims that
explicitly acknowledge location, rather than valuing the traditional claims
of unsituated objectivity. Recognizing knowledge which is explicitly
situated includes recognition of the (inevitable) partiality of the
perspective(s) from which the knowledge is produced, thus leaving space
for knowledge produced from other perspectives. The point is not only that
our experience is a basis for our knowledge. As Joan Scott and others have
argued, we as individuals are also constructed by our experience,51 meaning
that it is not possible simply to rely upon unmediated situatedness as the
basis of knowledge. Rather, knowledge and identity are co-constructing.
Our knowledge is based upon our situation, but our identity is also
constructed through our social experience and positioning. Haraway
emphasizes that acknowledgment of location is an acknowledgment of
responsibility in knowledge; like an undeclared conflict of interest,
unsituated knowledge-claims are irresponsible because they fail to
recognize the political implications of any knowledge. This will be
discussed later in more detail.
Mainstream legal knowledge has rarely acknowledged the fact that it
emanates from a particular perspective. As we have indicated, one vital
aspect of law's self-conception is that the identity of legal knowers is
supposedly irrelevant to the quality of the knowledge. Legal knowledge is
supposed to be objectively static, regardless of whether the perceiver is a
lesbian, a Black woman or a heterosexual middle-class white man.52 The
fact that law and legal knowledge have been overwhelmingly produced by
this last group of people is seen to be irrelevant to its quality as knowledge.
In our view this insistence that legal knowledge is whole and objective,
rather than partial and situated, results in a legal world-view which is
completely incapable of acknowledging true differences in perspective. In
our view, Western legal knowledge must be produced in full recognition of
its history and context. Legal knowers must be educated to recognize the
partiality of their own and the law's perspective.53 It is not enough for
legal knowers to simply absorb the perspectives of women or minorities.
This approach leads merely to our assimilation into the larger legal worid-
view.54 Rather, legal knowledge itself must give way and recognize its
own limitations and political context.
55
50. HARAWAY, supra note 13, at 191.
51. Joan W. Scott, Experience, in FEMImSTS THEORIZE rHn PoLriCAL 22 (Judith Butler
and Joan W. Scott eds., 1992).
52. See Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for
Narrative, 87 MicH. L. REV. 2411, 2441 (1989).
53. See HARAWAY, supra note 13.
54. See discussion infra Part IV.
55. Such an acknowledgment would not necessarily lead to the destruction of legal
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2. Valuing the View from Below
The second approach to valuing knowledge draws on feminist
standpoint epistemology, which has been developed by both Harding and
Haraway, among others.5 6  As we have indicated, feminist standpoint
epistemology argues that members of oppressed groups who engage in
struggles against oppressors produce 'truer' knowledge than members of
the oppressor groups. This is because in order to survive, the oppressed
group must understand the dimensions of the oppressive discourse and
practices, as well as their own position in it.57 The oppressors need only
understand the view from above. Harding says, 'Thinking from the
perspective of women's lives makes strange what had appeared familiar,
which is the beginning of any scientific inquiry. ' 58 According to Tern
Elliott, the 'epistemic privilege' of the standpoint is that the oppressed
person has knowledge of the obstacles in her or his life which are created
by the oppression, while the oppressors are ignorant of such matters.5 9
Unlike Harding and Haraway, we do not believe that valuing
standpoint leads to a more 'objective' or more 'scientific' knowledge.6°
Although the whole point of Haraway's work is to reject the notion of a
transcendent objectivity, the utilization of the terminology is difficult to
justify and possibly difficult to confine to the altered standard of objectivity
which she adopts. Instead, we would argue that a standpoint has the
potential to produce knowledge which is more useful in specific contexts.
Feminist standpoint epistemology can appear to be essentialist (and
sometimes is) insofar as it focuses primarily upon the division between
women and men, and upon a common woman's experience as the basis for
knowledge, although its fundamental character would undoubtedly shift. Our position is not
that legal knowledge is necessarily all wrong, or nonsense, as claimed in some of the more
radical works of Critical Legal Studies adherents, including Alan Freeman's Truth and
Mystification in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1229 (1981), Peter Gabel and Duncan
Kennedy's Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984) and Joseph William Singer's
The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984). Our
argument is, rather, that the claim to universality is nonsense and that by abandoning this
claim legal knowledge becomes much more capable of engaging with difference.
56. See sources cited supra note 16.
57. Harding outlines no less than eight interrelated reasons for preferring a feminist
standpoint to the "weak objective" standards of the view from above. WHOSE SCIENCE?,
supra note 18. In her argument that knowledge-formation is a function of emotion as well
as reason, Alison Jaggar says, "I would claim that the emotional responses of oppressed
people in general, and often of women in particular, are more likely to be appropriate than
the emotional responses of the dominant class." Alison Jaggar, Love and Knowledge:
Emotion in Feminist Epistemology, in GENDER/BODY/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 16, at 162
(Alison M. Jaggar & Susan R. Bordo eds., 1989).
58. HARDING, WHOSE SCiENCE?, supra note 18, at 150.
59. Terri Elliott, Making Strange What Had Appeared Familiar, 77 THE MONIST 424,
429 (1994).
60. Supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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"women's knowledge." 61 Knowledge claims that assume that all women
share one identity, especially when made by privileged white women,
62
may reproduce the problems with objectivity that feminists originally set
out to critique-i.e., a privileged perspective is imposed upon oppressed
63groups. For instance, Hartsock's influential work presupposed a
particular content which could be attributed to a women's standpoint, based
on experiences such as childbearing and women's "contribution to
subsistence."64 Harding's response to the charge of essentialism is that "the
logic of standpoint approaches contains within it both an essentializing
tendency and also resources to combat such a tendency.' 65 Although
standpoint theory can be used to essentialize groups of people, its logic is
also that no one group has an absolute privilege of perspective.
In our view, it is the existence of the standpoint which is important, but
it is vital that any standpoint be limited to its actual context, and not taken
as universal.66 Attributing a broad content of knowledge to any one group
without appreciation of the range of power differences will result in
empirically unsatisfying and potentially dangerous re-stereotyping.
Feminist standpoint epistemology remains useful if we recognize that the
knowledge produced by oppressed people is not better than knowledge
produced by oppressors because it is more 'objective.' Rather, we are
making a value judgment that the position from which the knowledge is
produced provides the knowledge producers with a different and often
more complete understanding of the oppression.
Again, there is a very clear legal application of this approach to valuing
knowledge. The traditional legal approach to knowledge has been that by
taking a distanced, appropriately detached position, all points of view can
be measured and given suitable weight in formulating an understanding of
61. Nancy Hartsock, The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically
Feminist Historical Materialism, in DISCOVERING REALITY 290 (Sandra Harding & Merrill
B. Hintikka eds., 1983) ("My effort here [is) an attempt to move toward a theory of the
extraction and appropriation of women's activity and women themselves. Still, I adopt this
strategy with some reluctance, since it contains the danger of making invisible the
experience of lesbians or women of color. At the same time, I recognize that the effort to
uncover a feminist standpoint assumes that there are some things common to all women's
lives in Western class societies." (citations omitted)).
62. See Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 581,585 (1990).
63. See Bartlett, supra note 18, at 873-74. But see Christine A. Littleton, Feminist
Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes, 41 STAN. L. REv. 751, 771-84 (1989)
(defending Catharine MacKinnon, who Katharine Bartlett identifies as using standpoint
epistemology, and arguing that her work is not essentialist).
64. See Hartsock, supra note 61. See the very different critiques of Hartsock's views in
Harriet Baber, The Market for Feminist Epistemology, 77 THE MONIST 403 (1994); Elliott,
supra note 59.
65. HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE?, supra note 18, at 180.
66. See Uma Narayan, The Project of Feminist Epistemology: Perspectives From a
Nonwestern Feminist, in GENDER/BODY/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 16, at 266.
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the world.67 However, as we have indicated, the flaw in this reasoning is
that the position which has historically been adopted is not distanced at all,
but firmly grounded in a White, male, middle-class perspective.68 This
perspective only parades as detachment. In reality it is a 'view from
above,' not a 'view from nowhere.' It is true that in its search for the
objective understanding of the world, law has sometimes listened to a
certain degree to the stories and perspectives of minority groups and
women.69 However, because it insists upon adopting the view from above,
law can never properly comprehend minority and marginalized knowledge.
It can only filter and assimilate such knowledge. Only when legal actors,
in the form of particular judges and policy makers, are able to relinquish
the objective/authoritative position will law be able to deal with non-
mainstream knowledge.
Valuation of expert testimony is one of many possible examples of the
'view from above'. It is still the case that the evidence of psychologists is
preferred to the evidence of battered women and children,70 that the
evidence of anthropologists is preferred to that of indigenous people71 and
that the evidence of medical practitioners is preferred to that of victims of
rape.72 In this way, law actively erases the views of those who according to
standpoint theory may have an 'epistemic privilege' in relation to a
particular matter.
3. Valuing Strategy
The recognition that all knowledge is situated and political creates a
third possibility for valuing knowledge. The political dimension of the
feminist critique of objectivity asserts that the claims of objectivity and
universality of knowledge have historically, in Western society, masked the
particular perspective of educated white men, and have thereby generally
furthered the interests of this group. As all knowledge is situated in a
particular location, in an unequal society all knowledge will be implicated
in challenging or upholding inequalities.73 We would argue that knowledge
67. This is known as the "god-trick' in HARAWAY, supra note 13, at 189.
68. See HARDING, supra note 18, at 111.
69. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971, 973
(1991); Delgado, supra note 52.
70. See the voluminous literature on battered woman syndrome, including Nan Seuffert,
Battered Women and Self-Defence, 17 N.Z.U. L. REV. 292 (1997); infra nn.163-66.
71. See generally Lyndall Ryan, Origins of a Royal Commission, 48 J. OF AUSTRALIAN
STUD. 1 (1996); Deane Fergie, Secret Envelopes and Inferential Tautologies, 48 J. OF
AUSTRALIAN STUD. 13 (1996); Christine Nicholls, Literacy and Gender, 48 J. OF
AUSTRALIAN STUD. 59 (1996).
72. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT FOR WOMEN, NEw SOUTH WALES, AUSTRALIA HEROINES OF
FORTITUDE: THE EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN IN COURT AS VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
(1996); Elisabeth McDonald, "Real rape" in New Zealand: Women Complainants'
Experience of the Court Process, 1 Y.B. OF N.Z. JURISPRUDENCE 59 (1997).
73. See FRamE, supra note 22, ch. 1.
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that challenges existing inequalities, or oppressions, should be valued over
knowledge that perpetuates inequalities, or knowledge that assumes there
are no existing inequalities. This valuing does not pretend to arise from an
epistemological ground, but from political and ethical motivations.74
Wendy Brown criticizes standpoint theory for its reliance on an alleged
moral superiority, arising from the position of the oppressed. She asks
what it would take for us to live "without such myths... [and] without
insisting that our truths are less partial and more moral than 'theirs."' 75 Her
argument is that feminism needs to develop an independently persuasive
vision. For us, part of that persuasive vision is not the moral superiority of
the oppressed, nor the greater 'objectivity' of a standpoint. Rather, it is the
practical and strategic effects of different kinds of knowledge when
measured against our social goal of true equality.
Therefore, valuing knowledge which explicitly acknowledges location
76
or standpoint epistemology is valuable as a strategy. We value located
knowledge and the 'view from below' partly because we believe that these
approaches currently provide more rational criteria for judging knowledge
than the spurious claims to objectivity of traditional legal knowledge.
Additionally, these approaches have the elementary political and ethical
values of recognition and respect for others. Such an ethic requires us-as
middle-class, White feminists-to take a position of reflective ignorance in
relation to others, admitting that our understanding of the world might be
completely useless in another context, even while we are attempting to
claim space from a mainstream discourse like law. In contrast to a
universally 'grounded' knowledge, therefore, knowledge valued for its
strategic benefits explicitly recognizes the connection between politics and
knowledge.
Such a view may appear to move too far away from the traditional
concept of epistemology-i.e., the search for the grounds of knowledge.
However, surely the whole point of epistemological justification is that
theories be advanced which make sense of the world in. a pragmatic world-
view. Of course, 'make sense of does not simply mean 'describe
faithfully,' but also 'construct realistically' or 'construct usefully.'
77
Advancing a new theory about the physical properties of time, for instance,
would not be much good if it explained less than previous theories. To say
it explains more does not necessarily mean that it is not a construction of
reality, just that it is a more useful one for present purposes. Similarly, the
74. See Elizabeth Grosz, Contemporary Theories of Power and Subjectivity, in FEMINIST
KNOWLE GE: CRmQUE AND CONSTRUCT 59 (Sneja Gunew ed., 1990).
75. BROWN, supra note 4, at 46-47.
76. As we have indicated, Sandra Harding continues to ,argue that standpoint
epistemology is more objective and more scientific than traditional universalist knowledge.
See supra note 43.
77. Cf. HARAWAY, supra note 13, at 188.
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whole point of theorizing oppression and situating knowledge is so that
sense is made of the world for particular people in particular contexts,
which can advance the project of eliminating power differentials. It is not
truth which matters, but utility. As Mary Hesse comments, "Acceptable




It is very important to recognize that, notwithstanding the universal-
sounding nature of what we have said about knowledge, our observations
apply only within the context of Western epistemology. For us, theories
about situated knowledges comprise a critical tool which aids in combating
the absolutism and paternalism of Western knowledge. The point for us is
to highlight the forced, imperialist, nature of Western 'knowledge' and its
oppressive products, not to argue a universal position regarding knowledge
for all cultural situations. The idea of situated knowledge is a critique of
current Western-influenced discourse, wherever it arises; it remains a way
of understanding the world which can only be measured for its 'truth'
within the context which produced it. This is an extremely important point.
It would constitute an "arrogant perception" to insist that all people must
recognize the contingent foundations of their knowledge.79 To say that an
Aboriginal or Maori belief is as contingent as Western 'objectivity '80 would
be once again to force a particular interpretation of the world onto a
cultural group and show extreme disrespect for its members. 81 To argue
otherwise would be to impose what we in the West understand as cultural
relativism on all people, even when their view of things may be what we
would see as cultural absolutism.
82
This may on one level appear contradictory: how can we possibly say
that knowledge is contingent and political, yet concede that the experience
of absolute foundations is nonetheless a viable option? In a paradoxical
"fashion, however, this can be our only conclusion. The recognition that
knowledge is not, for us, absolutely founded, cannot be extended to all
cultures because to do so is to repeat the traditional insistence on universal
foundations and to disregard questions of power which have
disenfranchised non-Western approaches to knowledge. 83 The question is
78. Mary Hesse, How to be Postmodern Without Being A Feminist, 77 THE MONIST 445,
447 (1994).
79. The term "arrogant perception" is from MARILYN FRYE, THE PoLrCs OF REAUTY
ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 75 (1983), as discussed by Maria Lugones, in Playfulness,
"World"-Traveling, and Loving Perception, 5 HYPATIA 139, 139 (1990).
80. See Sneja Gunew and Anna Yeatman, Introduction, in FEMINSM AND THE POLrMcS OF
DIFFERENCE xxiv (Sneja Gunew & Anna Yeatman eds., 1993).
81. See Seuffert, supra note 10 at 119-25.
82. See Johnston & Pihama, supra note 7.
83. See Seuffert, supra note 10, at 147; Lamer, supra note 10; Dorothy E. Smith, Telling
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not what applies in every context, but what is useful for making sense of
the context itself.
III. IDENTITY, POLITICS, KNOWLEDGE, AND LAW
Situating knowledge focuses attention on the integration of subject,
knowledge and politics. In this Part we will identify and analyze three,
often overlapping, types of identity politics in relation to law. The first is
resistance to the subordinate traits imposed by the dominant liberal
discourses. The second is a politics assumed to flow in a linear fashion
from assumptions of weak essentialism about an identity. Third, we would
like to consider the possibilities for strategic struggles that recognize that
subjectivity is a composite of culturally mapped identities. We agree with
other commentators that identity formation is a complex and ongoing
process which takes place within both largely determined dominant
discourses and more fluid resistant discourses over which we have some
control. Identity formation is therefore always political, and identity and
politics"4 are co-constructing and mutually reproductive.
A. IDENTITY PoLIcs AS RESISTANCE
Liberal feminists' resistance to the coding of women with traits that
have historically been constructed as inferior to the traits mapped as male
represents the first type of identity politics. According to many strands of
liberal theory,85 the essential, universal characteristics" of the subject of
law include rationality, autonomy, independence, individualism and
sovereignty. 8 These essential characteristics are used by each rational
subject to form his individual identity; the subject is assumed to be self-
the Truth After Postmodernism, 19(3) SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 171, 173 (1996) ("I argue
here that the poststructuralism/postmodernism critique of theories of language, meaning
reference and representation has 'slipped into the form' of the theories it criticizes, in
replicating obscurely the very universalized subject of knowledge it has repudiated.").
84. Little attention has been paid to the historical development of the meaning of the term
"identity politics" or to the specificity of context in which identity politics have been
practiced. See Eli Zaretsky, Identity Theory, Identity Politics: The Separation Between the
Public and the Private, in CRmCAL POLmcs: FROM THE PERSONAL TO THE GLOBAL 9-28
(Paul James ed., 1994). See also Phelan, supra note 15; Whisman, supra note 2; Anna
Yeatman, The Personal and the Political: A Feminist Critique in CRITICAL POLITICS: FROM
THE PERSONAL TO THE GLOBAL 35, 48-51 (Paul James ed., 1994).
85. See BROWN, supra note 4 at, 141. See generally CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE
SELF: TIMMAKNG OF MODERN IDENTITY (1989).
86. See BROWN, supra note 4, at 145; Drucilla Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern
Reconstructin of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 291, 305-08 (1985); Teresa De Lauretis, The
Essence of the Triangle or, Taking the Risk of Essentialism Seriously, in THm ESSENTIAL
DIFFERENCE 1, 2 (Naomi Schor & Elizabeth Weed eds., 1994); Zaretsky, supra note 84, at
16.
87. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITCS 195 (1975).
88. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1849); Pheng Cheah et al., Introduction: The
Body of the Law to THINKING THROUGH THE BODY OF THE LAW 1 (Pheng Cheah et al. eds.,
1996).
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reliant and self-made. 89 The subject and the world external to it are two
mutually exclusive 'concepts. 90 The subject may be acted upon by the
external world, but social conditioning is seen to overlay the 'true' self-
determined identity like the layers of skin on an onion. One of the aims of
the subject is therefore to be as free of social conditioning as possible.91
Feminists have thoroughly deconstructed the supposed universality of
law to reveal its embodiment of an educated, aggressive white male.
92
Feminists further critiqued the traditional notion of gender that the different
essential identities of women and men93 made up humanity.94 Maintenance
of the self-determining male subject of liberal theory within binary logic
required determining the female as the opposite and inferior objec?5 to the
male. The female was seen as irrational, passive, dependent and
96emotional. Many early liberal feminists argued for formal equality for
women in the law, seemingly based on a more inclusive conception of the
subject of the law through recognition of women as endowed with the same
essential characteristics as men: rationality, self-interest and self-
determination. 97 This logic formed the basis for arguments for equality of
treatment by the law; women were just as intelligent and rational as men
and therefore should be subject to the same legal rights, privileges and
duties as men.98 These political arguments, based on claims to a specific
identity by women, facilitated changes in the law to achieve formal
equality, eliminating explicit distinctions in the law between the treatment
of men and women.
99
This liberal approach to identity politics has been circumscribed by the
dominant discourses; by its own terms, it requires arguments for "special
89. See BROWN, supra note 4, at 67.
90. See RENE DESCARTES, MEDIATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY (Bobbs-Merill, 2d ed.
1960); MARGARET DAVIES, ASKING THE LAW QUESTION 222,241 (1994).
91. See DAVIES, supra note 90, at 241.
92. See NGAIRE NAFFINE, LAW AND THE SEXES: EXPLORATIONS IN FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCE 52 (1990); CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 86-115 (1988);
Cornell, supra note 86, at 293; Luce Irigaray, The Sex Which is Not One, in NEW FRENCH
FEMINISMS 99, 104 (E. Marks & I. DeCourtivron eds. & C. Reeder trans., 1984); Susan
Moller Okin, Justice and Gender, 16 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFFAIRS 42, 50 (1987).
93. See generally THOMAS LAQUEUR, MAKING SEX (1990); Thomas Laqueur, Orgasm,
Generation, and the Politics of Reproductive Biology, in THE MAKING OF THE MODERN
BODY (Catherine Gallagher & Thomas Laqueur eds., 1987).
94. See Ngaire Naffine & Rosemary J. Owens, Sexing Law, in SEXING THE SUBJECT OF
LAW 8-10 (Ngaire Naffine & Rosemary J. Owens eds., 1997).
95. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 55 (1987).
96. See BROWN, supra note 4, at 152; CORNELL, supra note 45, at 137; DIANA FUSS,
ESSENTIALLY SPEAKING: FEMINISM, NATURE & DIFFERENCE 2-4 (1989); Ngaire Naffine,
Sexing the Subject (of Law), in PUBUC AND PRIVATE: FEMINIST LEGAL DEBATES 18-20, 24,
27-36 (Margaret Thornton ed., 1995). See also Cornell, supra note 86, at 310.
97. See DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 5, at xxxiii-xxxiv; BROWN, supra note 4, at 155.
98. See NAFFINE, supra note 92, at3-6.
99. See id. at 6.
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treatment" where women are "different" from men.1°° Other problems with
this approach include that it leaves unchallenged at the center the liberal
conception of the subject, liberalisms' 'constitutive dualisms' and the
marginalization of politicized identities.10' For example, claims to the right
to marry by gays and lesbians1°2 are problematic as claims to inclusion in
that the liberal conception of the subject is still central. These types of
normalizing claims, like liberal feminists' claims that women are the same
as men, are successful to the extent that gays and lesbians can claim to be
the same as heterosexuals, but different treatment based on constructions of
'real' differences will still be justified.
B. IDENTY POLITICS BASED ON WEAK ESSENTIALISM
The second type of identity politics challenges the existence of the
essential characteristics of the liberal subject assumed by many strands of
liberal theory. Feminists and others have debated both the existence and
the content of an essential core of universal human, or female, nature. For
purposes of our discussion, we distinguish between 'strong' and 'weak'
essentialism. Essentialism in its strong or metaphysical sense is often taken
to refer to the characteristics seen to be universal to the human subject; it is
the "God-given or otherwise immutable nature" of the subject.10 3 In the
traditional philosophical theories discussed above, these characteristics are
rationality and self-determination. A 'weak' conception of essentialism
retains the notion of an essential core, but may debate what is in that core,
and whether the core is fixed, gendered or determined by culture. 1°4
While there are a few feminist theorists who currently ascribe to
essentialism in its strong or metaphysical sense,1°5 many feminists have
profoundly challenged the idea of strong essentialism,10 6 adopting instead
Simone de Beauvoir's statement that, "One is not born, but rather becomes,
a woman." 7  Feminist essentialism for many of these feminists is
therefore 'weak' or strategic essentialism.0 8 Other liberal, cultural, radical,
Marxist and postmodern feminists make arguments which seemingly
combine weak essentialism and social constructionism. Some feminists
100. BROWN, supra note 4, at 158; MACKINNON, supra note 16, at 8-9.
101. BROWN, supra note 4, at 152; MARTHA MINOW, NOT ONLY FOR MYSELF: IDENTITY,
PoLITIcs AND THE LAW 54-55 (1997).
102. See Quilter v. Attorney Gen. [1996] N.Z.L.R. 481.
103. De Lauretis, supra note 86, at 1, 3.
104. See Fuss, supra note 96, at 1-5; De Lauretis, supra note 86.
105. See generally TANiA MODLESKI, FEMINISM WITHOUT WOMEN: CULTURE AND
CRITICISM IN A "PosTFMNIST' AGE (1991); Rosi Braidotti, On the Female Feminist
Subject, or: From 'She-self to 'She-Other, in BEYOND EQUALITY AND DIFFERENCE:
CITIZENSHIP, FEMINIST POLInCS AND FEMALE SUBJECTIVITY ch. 10 (Gisela Bock & Susan
James eds., 1992).
106. See De Lauretis, supra note 86, at 3.
107. DEBEAUvOIR, supra note 5, at 295.
108. See De Lauretis, supra note 86, at 3-4.
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have argued that the traits ascribed to women in a patriarchal culture, 1°9
while masquerading as biological or natural traits that are fixed and
essentialist in the strong metaphysical sense, are actually socially
determined or conditioned.110 Feminists have used the concept of social
conditioning to argue that women are not naturally irrational, passive,
dependent and emotional care givers, but rather have been socially
conditioned to conform to a feminine model that exhibits these traits. For
example, Catherine MacKinnon has argued that the category 'women' is
socially constructed by men, in their interests." In more recent years,
debate over whether MacKinnon's work is essentialist, in the sense that it
has been based on assumptions about what it means to live as a woman, has
raged. This essentialism is not essentialism in the strong or metaphysical
sense, but rather weak essentialism as it refers to social conditions which
are imposed upon women.
Other feminists have maintained an explicit or implicit reference to
what has been called a weak or nominal form of essentialism.112  This
nominal essence can be recognition of a set of traits that have been imposed
upon all women,' 3 or that are specific to a culture and historical period or
that a particular feminist or feminists argue women should embrace'14 or
aspire to." 5 Some feminists have argued that these essences are important
ones that should be valued in women and others.1 6 For example, Carol
Gilligan identified a moral ethic of care shared by many of the women that
she interviewed' 1 7 She explicitly acknowledged that the characteristics on
which she based this ethic of care were due to social conditioning rather
than biological destiny. 118 Gilligan's work was used by feminists in law to
109. See DAVIES, supra note 90, at 167-68.
110. See HARRIuT BRADLEY, FRACTURED IDENTITIES: CHANGING PATTERNS OF INEQUALITY
89 (1996).
111. MACKINNON, supra note 42, at 75-76. See also Christine Littleton, Feminist
Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes, 41 STAN. L. REV. 751,763-71 (1989).
112. See Fuss, supra note 96 at 4-5; De Lauretis, supra note 86, at 3.
113. See, e.g., NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS
AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
114. See generally CHODOROW, supra note 114; SARAH RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING:
TOWARD A POLITICS OF PEACE (1989); ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY AND LAW 179-
249 (1993); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Cm. L. REV. 1, 1 (1988); Robin
West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist
Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 84-87 (1987); WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF SELF, VOICE, AND MIND (Mary Field Belenky et al. eds., 1986).
115. See, e.g., MARY DALY, GYN/ECOLOGY: THE METAETHICS OF RADICAL FEMINISM
(1978); ANDREA DWORKUN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1979); AUDRE
LORDE, SISTER OUTSIDER (1984).
116. See DRUCILLA CORNELL, TRANSFORMATIONS: RECOLLECTvE IMAGINATION AND
SExuAL DIFFERENCE 6 (1993).
117. GILLIGAN, supra note 113 (interviewing mostly White, middle-class women). See
also AN ETHIC OF CARE: FEMINIST AND INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 41
(contributing to the extensive debate surrounding Gilligan's work).
118. See GILLIGAN, supra note 113.
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make arguments ranging from gender-related legal ethics to a focus on
relationships in resolving contract disputes. 19
Ruthann Robson's discussion of lesbian identity politics 120 provides an
example of theorizing identity politics based on weak essentialism.
121
These types of identity politics have been based on two assumptions: that
lesbians (or women generally) share an essential identity in that the group
identities are part of the social structure and not innate, God-given or
natural and that a particular set of politics flows from this identity.
12 2
Robson's description suggests an underlying assumption of linear
progression from identity to experiences to thinking to politics. There are
three points worth making here about the limitations of this conception of
identity politics. First, the identity, even if socially constructed, precedes
the experiences, thinking and politics; there is no suggestion that
experiences or politics reshape identity or influence each other.123 These
assumptions also often underlie feminist identity politics more generally.124
Second, the on-going debates about who is a lesbian (or what
constitutes lesbian identity) and what set of politics flow from this
identity'25 have highlighted the dangers of identity politics based on even
'weak' essentialism. Identity politics based on a fixed, totalizing identity
are likely to replicate problems with liberal theory.1 26 The creation of
'other' lesbians 27 (or women) 128 is necessary to maintain the status of
119. See Naomi R. Cahn, A Preliminary Feminist Critique of Legal Ethics, 4 GEo. J.
LEGAL ETHICs 23, 46 (1990); David R. Dow, Law School Feminist Chic and Respect for
Persons: Comments on Contract Theory and Feminism in The Flesh-Colored Band Aid, 28
Hous. L. REV. 819, 849-852 (1991); Patricia A. Tidwell & Peter Linzer, The Flesh-Colored
Band-Aid-Contracts, Feminism, Dialogue, and Norms, 28 Hous. L. REv. 791, 798-99
(1991).
120. Ruthann Robson, The Specter of a Lesbian Supreme Court Justice: Problems of
Identity in Lesbian Legal Theorizing, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 433, 434-40 (1993). See also
Mary Eaton, At the Intersection of Gender and Sexual Orientation: Toward Lesbian
Jurisprudence, 3 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 183, 184 (1994).
121. See Diana Majury, Refashioning the Unfashionable: Claiming Lesbian Identities in
the Legal Context, 7 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 286, 303, n.54 (1993). See also Eaton, supra
note 120, at 186.
122. See Robson, supra note 120, at 435. See also Yeatman, supra note 84, at 48-51;
Zaretsky, supra note 84, at 19-21.
123. See Robson, supra note 120, at 456.
124. See Steven Angelides, Rethinking the Political: Poststructuralism and the Economy
of(Hetero)Sexuality, 1 CRrrICAL INQUEERIES 27, 27 (1995).
125. See, e.g., Allison Jones & Camille Guy, Radical Feminism in New Zealand: From
Piha to Newtown, in FIEMNST VoIcEs 300-16 (Rosemary DuPlessis et al. eds., 1992).
126. See Gail Mason, (Out) Laws: Acts of Proscription in the Sexual Order, in PuBLIc AND
PRVATE: FEMINIST LEGAL DEBATES 88 (Margaret Thornton ed., 1995); Angelides, supra
note 124, at 30.
127. See Tracy Morgan, Butch-Femme and the Politics of Identity, in SISTERS, SEXPERTS,
QUEERS: BEYOND THE LESBIAN NATION 35, 36-37 (Arlene Stein ed., 1993). See also SHANE
PHELAN, IDENTITY POLmcs: LESBIAN FEMINISM AND THE LIMrrs OF COMMUNITY (1989), at
63-76.
128. See CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAw 23 (1989).
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subject identity. As Shane Phelan comments, the "'second wave' of
identity politics involves a recognition that the differences within a group
are as important as the similarities. This means that any a priori ideas
about justice, about equality and about our location in social space must be
reexamined, not once, but continuously."' 29
Third, this conception of identity politics is similar to the resistance
based conception, in the sense that it assumes that the commonalties on
which identity is based are due to experiences of oppression resulting from
the imposition of negative aspects of those identities. However, this
conception also, at least potentially, opens space for politics that are not
limited to resistance.
For example, the dominant liberal conception of the subject excludes
lesbians from the category of women' 3° and fails to provide any other
subject positioning for lesbians. It has been argued that lesbians are
peripheral and extraneous to these discourses, surrounded by a discourse of
silence, a "discourse-which-is-not-a-discourse", 131 resulting in lesbians as
(un)subjects. 32 However, discourses of criminality and female perversion
prohibited such activities as women wearing more than three pieces of
men's clothing.1 33 While resistance to the construction of (heterosexual)
women as irrational and emotional resulted in claims to value as rational
subjects, resistance by lesbians focused in part on making the invisible
visible and on countering the imposition of criminality through the politics
of 'coming out.' 34  Coming out assumes at least that one's sexual
orientation is an important part of one's identity or that it constitutes
identity in some essential manner. 135 However, coming out can mean an
on-going, daily and even hourly effort; its dangers include harassment and
anti-lesbian violence, as well as, everyday prejudice and discrimination.136
Lesbians may therefore choose strategic invisibility by coming out where
safety is relatively assured, to select groups of trusted people.
1 37
Invisibility is challenged by coming out and deviance is challenged by
status as someone's daughter, friend, co-worker, etc. However, 'strategic'
129. Shane Phelan, (Be)Coming Out: Lesbian Identity and Politics, 18 SIGNs 765, 780
(1993).
130. See Mason, supra note 126, at 73-74 (citing MONIQuE WrrriG, THE STRAIGIrr MD
AND OTHER ESSAYS 40 (1992)).
131. Id. at79.
132. Judith Butler, Imitation and Gender Insubordination, in INsID./Otrr: LESBIAN
THEORIES, GAY THEORIES 20 (Diana Fuss ed., 1991).
133. Lesbians in different jurisdictions and across historical periods have been punished
for engaging in sexual relations with other women, and for crossing gender lines. See
Ruthann Robson, Lesbianism in Anglo and European Legal History, 5 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J.
1, 3 (1990). See also Phelan, supra note 129, at 25.
134. See Phelan, supra note 129, at 103.
135. See id. at 103-04.
136. See Mason, supra note 126, at 81. See also Robson, supra note 120, at 448.
137. See Mason, supra note 126, at 79.
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visibility may simultaneously reinforce invisibility, leave lesbian
'deviance' unchallenged and reconstruct the central liberal subject as
normal. Simultaneously, as this politics gains momentum, the challenge to
invisibility builds, by carving more space out of the dominant discourses
and reshaping those discourses. Resistance may be largely configured
within the dominant discourses by appropriating of marginal categories or
aspiring to the center; it may also serve to reconfigure those categories and
discourses. For example, at the same time that claims for gay and lesbian
marriage are claims to normalization, it seems likely that this extension of
the institution of marriage would also reconfigure it. Same sex marriage
highlights and extends fissures in a monolithically patriarchal paradigm.
C. POSTMODERN IDENTITY POLITICS
Anti-essentialists, or postmodern social constructionists, reject
essentialism in any of its forms, arguing instead that identity is constructed
relationally through complex and sometimes contradictory discursive
practices .138 As subjects, we can only know ourselves through interaction
and contrast with other subjects: 139  "The body is 'always already'
culturally mapped; it never exists in a pure or uncoded state." 140 "Cultural
mapping" refers to the ways in which messages produced by the culture in
which we live constitute who we are. All identities are socially constructed
in complex interactions played out through various discourses including
law, the media, the arts and politics.
141
The mapping of traits onto the female body suggests a totalizing
passivity of her identity.' 42 However, constructionism does not require
discarding the possibility of agency, "Subjects are constituted discursively,
but there are conflicts among discursive systems, contradictions within any
one of them, multiple meanings possible for the concepts they deploy."' 4'
Women have had statuses that deny agency conferred upon them and have
acted to contest these statuses and to create identities taking advantage of
the contradictions and gaps in the discourses. Women act, constantly
creating and re-creating their identities, the dominant discursive systems,
and the statuses conferred upon them. This agency does not mean that
women are all equally capable of re-creating themselves and the world
around them in any manner that they choose at any time. 4  Despite
138. See DAVIEs, supra note 90, at 242.
139. See id. at 242-43.
140. Fuss, supra note 96, at 5-6.
141. See generally JONATHAN D. CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND CRriCIsM
AFtER STRUCTURALISM (1982).
142. See SMART, supra note 128, at 24. See also JuDrrH BUTLER, THE PsYcHIc LIFE OF
POWER (1997).
143. Scott, supra note 51, at 34 (citations omitted).
144. See MINOW, supra note 101, at 45, 52 (1997). See also Lucie E White, Seeking
'...The Faces of Otherness': A Response to Professors Sarat, Felstiner, and Cahn, 77
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agency, women's conferred statuses configure their actions.'
45
This more complex and fluid conception of identity challenges some
feminists' assumptions of weak essentialism and of a linear progression
from identity to politics. Identities, as well as experiences, thinking and
politics are constituted discursively. Women act to create and re-create
their identities, influencing the discursive systems within which they are
constituted, and thereby influencing the construction of experiences,
thinking and politics. 46 For example, each time a group of women takes
action that they name 'feminist' they recreate feminism and themselves as
feminists; "[Feminists, and feminism as the movement they constitute, do
not precede but are constituted within feminist acts of contestation and
politicization."' 47
This is not to suggest that feminists should refuse to adopt any
categories of identities. The categories 'lesbian' and 'women' are not
universal, absolute or 'real': they are given to us by the dominant culture,'
48
which also determines to a large extent the focus and nature of our political
struggles. To recognize this is simply to place an emphasis on the
constructed nature of identity, and to acknowledge that the configuration
within which we are constructed is not separable from the oppression
which we experience. It is not as though lesbians as a category of people
exist prior to the oppressive system, but rather that the category 'lesbian' is
one of the products of a system which institutionalizes heterosexuality, and
excludes those who do not live according to dominant norms.
A refusal to adopt categories of identity would be counterproductive
for it would leave no space, not even a strategically constructed one, in
which to engage in political struggle. Instead of rejecting categories of
identities, we should adopt "coalitions that are based not on stable identities
but on the recognition that some social signifiers presently embody and
transmit relations of oppression.' '149 What is needed are "cultivated political
spaces for posing and questioning feminist political norms, for discussing
the nature of 'the good' for women."'
150
D. IDENTiTY POLITICS AND KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION IN LAW
The implications of radical social constructionist ideas of identity and
identity politics have rarely been considered in relation to knowledge
production in law. The law's assumptions of an essentially unified,
rational, autonomous, aggressive white male actor are still firmly congealed
CoRNELLL. Rsv. 1499, 1505 (1992).
145. See DAVIES, supra note 90, at 253.
146. See Eaton, supra note 120, at 187.
147. Yeatman, supra note 84, at 39.
148. See WITrIG, supra note 130.
149. Phelan, supra note 129, at 782; Cf PHELAN, supra note 127.
150. BRoWN, supra note 4, at 49.
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in its dominant discourses.151 Feminists and others with a vision of justice
that includes the reflection of diverse and fluid identities 152 in the law must
also recognize that these discourses are not as easily displaced as the term
'fluid' often implies. Like quicksand, dominant discourses present a
deceptively harmless and tranquil surface, yet are always ready to swallow
up and cover efforts at resistance and transformation. This is not to suggest
that feminists' often heroic efforts to change the law and legal discourses
have all failed.153 In Aotearoa/New Zealand, for example, feminists have
recently been successful in advocating for changes to domestic violence
laws that reflect a feminist analysis of domestic violence as a range of
abusive tactics used to gain and maintain power and control over women. 154
However, feminist arguments that most confine women to the traditional
essentialized notions of women and motherhood are likely to prove more
successful in the legal system.155
It has been suggested that rethinking approaches to the marginal
identities of 'bisexual' and 'femme' might provide one vehicle for the
recognition and reflection of the complexities of identity formation
resulting from cultural mapping in the congealed dominant discourses of
the legal system.156 The underlying assumptions of autonomous liberal
conceptions of identity and feminist critiques which assume fixed identities
and focus on patriarchy tend to dismiss both 'bisexuals' 157 and 'femmes'. 158
People who adopt these identity categories are critiqued as "sitting on the
fence" and continuing to benefit from the privilege of heterosexual
identity.' 59 Focusing theoretical attention on the complex constructions of
marginal identities that do not fit into the dominant dichotomous,
hierarchical ordering of sexuality, reveals a multiplicity of categories and
identities. 6° However, a danger of focusing on a multiplicity of marginal
categories is that of leaving the dominant categories and the violence that
reinforces them unchallenged.'
16
Shifting attention to constructed identities highlights the law's
151. See SMART, supra note 128, at 25, 37; See also Cheah, supra note 88; Cathy A.
Harris, Outing Privacy Litigation: Toward a Contextual Strategy for Lesbian and Gay
Rights, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 248,266 (1997).
152. See Angelides, supra note 124, at 42.
153. See SMART, supra note 128.
154. See Domestic Violence Act, 1995 (N.Z.). See also Linda G. Mills, On the Other Side
of Silence: Affective Lawyeringfor Intimate Abuse, 81 CORNELLL. REV. 1225, 1236 (1996).
155. See SMART, supra note 128, at 25.
156. See id. at 28.
157. See Angelides, supra note 124. See also VERA WHISMAN, QUEER BY CHOICE:
LESBIANS, GAY MEN AND THE POLmCS OFIDENTITY 21, 26 (1996).
158. See SMART, supra note 128; WHISMAN, supra note 158, at 28; Morgan, supra note
128, at 36-37.
159. See PHELAN, supra note 127, at 71-72.
160. See WHISMAN, supra note 157, at 21; Margaret Davies, Taking the Inside Out, in
SEXING THE SUBJECT OF LAW, supra note 94, at 45.
161. See Davies, supra note 160, at45.
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assumption of a unified identity. The use of battered woman's syndrome
evidence is one example of how this affects women. Although feminists
intend to use this syndrome to highlight the reasonableness of women's
actions, it has been interpreted through the dominant lenses to view women
as irrational and slightly mad. It has also been argued persuasively that use
of this expert evidence is most likely to benefit women who fit the
dominant stereotype of the 'good victim' .162 Good victims have generally
been almost completely passive in the face of horrific abuse, have often
made heroic efforts to maintain an otherwise stable family environment for
their children and have usually expressed deep remorse for killing the
abuser. This image of the 'good victim' is consistent with the 'feminine'
traits ascribed to women by liberal theory's construction of the unified,
essential subject as male. 16  When a woman strays from a dominant
conception of the good victim, even in matters that are technically
irrelevant to her case, she is much less likely to be acquitted.164 For
example, if she is an alcoholic, lesbian, 165 an assertive Black woman, buries
the abuser in the garden,166 otherwise fails to exhibit remorse or is a
competent professional, she is less likely to be aided by battered woman
syndrome evidence. Law's assumption of a unified subject limits its ability
to recognize personhood as complex and culturally mapped.
Complex personhood means that all people (albeit in specific forms
whose specificity is sometimes everything) remember and forget,
are beset by contradiction, and recognize and misrecognize
themselves and others. Complex personhood means that people
suffer graciously and selfishly too, get stuck in the symptoms of
their troubles, and also transform themselves.
167
Recognition of complex personhood allows the law to see these
women's compliance with the dominant discourses construction of their
gender as passive reflected in their passivity in the public sphere and in
relation to their male abusers. The courage and strength required for
162. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1243, 1271 (1991). See also
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and
Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 520, 531-35 (1992).
163. See A. Renee Callahan, Will the "Real" Battered Woman Please Stand Up? In
Search of a Realistic Legal Definition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER &
L. 117, 120 (1994).
164. See Elizabeth A. Sheehy et al., Defending Battered Women on Trial: The Battered
Woman Syndrome and its Limitations, 16 CRIM. L.J. 369, 375-376 (1992).
165. See Denise Bricker, Fatal Defense: An Analysis of Battered Woman's Syndrome
Expert Testimony for Gay Men and Lesbians Who Kill Abusive Partners, 5S BROOK. L.
REV. 1379, 1382-83 (1993).
166. See, e.g., R v. Oakes [1995] 2 N.Z.L.R. 673.
167. Avery Gordon, GHOSTLY MATrERS: HAUNTING AND THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION
(1997).
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domestic violence victims to resist these dominant discourses is visible in
their refusal to remain passive or to deny their own strength or anger. Their
agency in acknowledging responsibility for the relationships (and their
breakdown), and in their attempts to maintain their families provides
another level of complexity. The enormous strain imposed by the
contradictions in these positions which sometimes results in, for example,
substance abuse, might then be understandable. Deconstructing these
dominant and resistant discourses allows a more complete analysis of why
women may fight back and kill their male abusers.
One remarkable Canadian decision recognizes some of the
complexities of identity formation for a formerly battered woman:
The tapes spoke volumes of the abuse reaped on this accused by
Shaw [the abuser whom she killed]. They also revealed the
accused to be verbally aggressive and abusive and "one tough
woman" by most people's standards. One does not negate the
other, in my opinion .... Those who would disregard or mock her
portrayal as a victim in her intimate relationships, given her
subsequent and violent criminal behaviour for which she is being
severely punished, suffer, in my opinion, from a rather myopic
view of what is a victim and fail fully to appreciate the 'battered
wife' syndrome .... All victims of abuse, not only those who are
sweet, meek and conform to the stereotyped acceptable behaviour
for a female, are deserving of some compassion and the
opportunity to break the cycle through rehabilitation and
counselling.
168
This passage recognizes the complexities of identity. It refuses to
assume that victim status is negated by aggression, opening possibilities for
recognition of identity as both victim and agent. 69 In the last sentence it
disaggregates victim and "sweet, meek" and "female," suggesting that
these categories are not necessarily inexorably linked, and that Bennett is a
victim as a result of acts perpetrated against her, rather than as a lifetime
status. However, the Court still employs a victim/agent dichotomy by
confining compassion to the victim aspects of identity.
Postmodern social constructionist conceptions of identity recognize
complexities of identity formation. Our gloss on these conceptions requires
recognition also of the congealed aspects of the dominant discourses, which
highlight that while these discourses are malleable, they are not subject to
whimsical reconstruction equally by all subjects. Identity formation and
politics are thus always mutually reproductive. Recognition of this mutual
168. R v. Bennett [No 2], [1993] OJ No.892 (Ont. Prov. CL) at 13.
169. See Callahan, supra note 163. See also ALICE WALKER & PRATIBHA PARMAR,
WARRIOR MARKS: FEMALE GENrrAL MUTILATION AND THE SEXUAL BLINDING OF WOMEN
251-52 (1993).
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reproduction in law is a complex project, but this is not an argument
against it; the production of justice has always been a complex project.
IV. THEORY AND POLITICS
What then, is the relationship between the arguments we have
presented in Part II about valuing knowledge, and the reconstructed identity
politics we outlined in Part I? How can an idea of knowledge based upon
the identity of a person in a particular social position survive the
recognition that there is no unitary identity as such but rather identities that
are mapped, fragmented and overlapping many of the categories of
"difference" laid down by the canonical discourses?
Wendy Brown identifies a variant of this question as grounding some
contradictory tendencies in feminist theory, in particular the tension
between recognition that identity as a woman is a constructed identity, and
the idea that this constructed identity contains some truth about the world
not available elsewhere.170 'The world from women's point of view' and
'the feminist standpoint' attempt resolution of the post-foundational
epistemology problem by deriving from within women's experience the
grounding for women's accounts. But this resolution requires suspending
recognition that women's 'experience' is thoroughly constructed,
historically and culturally varied, and interpreted without end.
That which Brown appears to regard as a weakness in feminist
standpoint theory-that it at some point means suspending our
interrogation of identity construction-we would regard as a necessary
moment in any political action. 'We' (whoever that is) also need to
suspend our interrogation of ourselves and our justification for our
knowledge if we are to say anything at all with certainty. Suspension is
indeed required, especially in law where there is an imperative to make
decisions. 17 1 However, the fact that it is necessary at some stage to stop,
take stock, and proceed as if the world were much simpler than we know it
to be, does not mean that all questions will stop forever, or that any
decision made will exclude further future examination. Nor does this
suspending of questioning necessarily invalidate our action: that would
only be the case if we assumed, like traditional ethical approaches, that we
require some non-contradictory grounding for our approach. As Brown
herself argues, the "postmodern condition" does not require that we are
caught forever in an infinitely complex process of interpretation, specificity
and contestable meanings or subject-positions. 172 It does mean that we
must take responsibility for ourselves and our knowledge. We cannot
170. BROWN, supra, note 4, at 41.
171. See DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE LuvM 133-35 (19092); DAVIES,
supra note 46, at 147-49.
172. BROWN, supra note 4.
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disown knowledge on the ground that it is unethical: at its core it is ethical.
As white women, we cannot disclaim responsibility for the privilege which
a racist society and legal system confers upon us. Perhaps unfortunately,
we can never expect our thoughts and actions always to be perfectly
synthesized in an unchallengeable relationship, but to be always open to
question, alteration and revision. In particular, we have a responsibility
continually to revise our understanding of the world and our engagement
with it in response to non-mainstream cultural information.
How then, can these complex issues of identity and knowledge be
negotiated? Before returning to the three methods of valuing knowledge
which we sketched in Part II, it is important to re-emphasize that, in our
view, identity and knowledge are interrelated and mutually constituting
dimensions of a complex political environment. Clearly, from our
discussion, it is recognized in current theory that neither identity nor
knowledge can be politically innocent, meaning that traditional notions of
epistemology and ontology (the study of knowing and being) have been
recast as political rather than purely philosophical. Mapping of identity
carries with it political implications, and our response to identities which
we are given or which we adopt will of necessity be political. Any
knowledge formation takes place within a tradition, in our case the White
tradition or 'white mythology' of the liberal West. We do not escape this
tradition by challenging it, but we may develop a more reflective and
strategically useful understanding of it and of ourselves.
We would now like to make some brief additional comments about the
relationship between knowledge and identity in the context of law, trying to
draw together the threads of Parts II and III. First, we said that knowledge
can be valued when the 'knower' explicitly acknowledges and attempts to
come to terms with her or his position within systems of oppression. In
light of the arguments presented in Part III of this article, such an
acknowledgment cannot be based naively upon any of the social categories
given to us, but must be presented in recognition that these categories and
therefore our knowledge are the effects of a social configuration of power
which is also implicated as the oppressive system which we wish to
transform. Our "situatedness" must continually be revised, understood as
complex, and conditional. The fact that at some point questioning of
identity must be suspended in order to assume a position as a speaking
subject does not invalidate the need to revisit questions of identity
construction.
This can be a very difficult matter, especially given that the law,
through its agents, presents such a fixed and unsituated face to the world
space. Is it not counter-productive to confront such a seemingly rigid
structure with a knowledge which is itself a terrain of struggle between
173. See Phelan, supra note 129.
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dominant stereotypes and the continually contested meanings of those who
identify with the position? Won't the fixed position win out every time, as
it has done in the past? However, to look at this question of rigidity in the
law from a different angle, feminist theory, lesbian theory, race theory,
critical legal studies and other critical movements have all exposed many
cracks in the facade and basic construction of law. Law is increasingly
recognized by critical scholars as lacking the 'objectivity' it loves. Even in
the community, law has lost its once certain authority and claim to truth. In
our view, those who are legally powerful-policy makers, practitioners,
judges, legislators-can regain some authority by learning to position their
own understanding of the world, and by recognizing the limitations of their
own perspective. The consequence, of course, is an appreciation that
mainstream legal knowledge is just as partial as perspectives defined by
their otherness to the mainstream.
Several consequences may flow from this recognition of the fallibility
and partiality of legal institutions, legal doctrines and legal officers-in
particular, the realization that law is a function of cultural and human
systems of meaning, not of inherent, natural, necessary or rational
structures. We should not regard 'Law' as an insurmountable obstacle or
monolith which is too fixed to undergo fundamental change: reifying law
so that it takes on the all-powerful symbolism of an authoritarian dictator
will not increase our morale about achieving a widespread change in the
legal conscience. Moreover, it may be time to begin to question the
supposed singularity of law, especially in light of increasing claims by
indigenous peoples to have their own legal systems recognized. Are we
able to develop and work with a concept of law which is capable of
recognizing, not merely assimilating, multiple visions and distinct identities
in a political setting?
Secondly, we stated that primarily for political and secondarily for
logical reasons (if any are needed), there is a value in the view from below.
As we have emphasized, no standpoint can be regarded as politically
neutral, and no standpoint achieves epistemic privilege because of its
innocent or unconstructed identity. Politically aware adoption of identity-
positions and critical reflection on the norms which govern our socially
mapped identities ought to lead to knowledge-claims which are neither
absolute nor innocent. Knowledge claims must have a strategic and
transformative potential, indeed are necessary to any substantial social
and/or legal transformation. Having said this, the critique of epistemology
which arises within our Western cultural and philosophical framework
cannot-at the risk of further imperialism-be claimed to have a universal
application. It ought to aid us in our project of challenging that
imperialism and not be used to recreate it in another form. We have
provisionally rejected the terminology of 'objectivity,' because at the very
least it implies some unmediated foundation of knowledge, and at most
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carries with it the danger that a perspective presented as partial will expand
to silence other minority views.
There is clearly a danger of misunderstanding here. Having
appreciated that law is not 'objective,' the tendency of some theory is to
attempt to improve the objectivity of law; to make it more inclusive, more
representative and force it to take in and assimilate stereotyped 'Others.'
While the goal of diversifying law and legal representatives is an important
one, it may only result in assimilation and compromise, and a further
empowerment of a discourse which has no need to prove its adaptability,' 74
but every reason to prove its capacity to listen rather than silence, and to
maintain and encourage, rather than suppress otherness. Understanding a
situated approach to knowledge as based on identities, contexts and
political positions which are contingent, changing and always complex,
makes the legal task more difficult but not impossible. We are faced with
the strategic choice between complying in the legal preference for a single
approach or policy, or attempting to reflect situations in all of their
difficulty, complexity, and non-rationality (which may appear to be less
effective in the short term). As feminist legal thinkers are only too well
aware, there is no easy solution to this dilemma, leaving us to work
simultaneously on many fronts. Thus while law may itself become more
diverse and open, the project of resistance to its totalizing tendencies is an
ongoing and essential one-until legal ideology renounces the view from
above.
These reflections lead us into the third aspect of valuing knowledge
which we outlined, the appreciation of the political and strategic direction
of our knowledge. As we have indicated identity, like knowledge, presents
us with politically loaded issues which must be in the foreground, not on
the sideline, in our engagement with law. Only in this way can the
importance of identity to knowledge be operational in a legal context. It is
not necessary to add a great deal more on this topic at this stage: we would
only comment that it requires an ongoing effort at self-reflection and
resistance to the slow creep of conservatism, normality and assumptions of
epistemological certainty, as well as a ceaseless and multi-faceted critique
of legal institutions.
V. CONCLUSION
The point of this paper has been to indicate some of the more practical
issues which arise in any consideration of the relationship between power,
identity, knowledge and law. Throughout the paper we have attempted to
do two things: to situate ourselves continually in relation to the questions of
174. The paradoxical adaptability of the common law which takes place in an overriding
spirit of conservation is traditionally seen as one of its great strengths. See, e.g., Julius
Stone, The Ratio of the Ratio Decidendi, 22 MOD. L. REv. 597, 597 (1959).
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knowledge and identity construction which have arisen, and to connect our
observations to specific legal problems. But how do you-the white lesbian
academic who tomorrow must speak to the judicial education seminar on
promissory estoppel-feel at this point? Probably not very different from
how you felt at the beginning of the article. You are, after all, still going to
be confronted by a resistant world: the largely male, white and middle-class
group of judges, whatever their own personal qualities, who still benefit
from an ideology and an institutional power which privileges their word.
No amount of theory will change the fact that they are the ones to decide
what gets heard, and if heard, what gets believed, and if believed, what gets
taken into account. They will listen, hopefully openly, and then they will
continue to make the decisions. As yet, we do not have the means of
eliminating, minimizing or making heterogeneous this power of decision-
making held by those who (like judges) make crucial determinations about
social relations. The law and its agents are still what appear to be a series
of brick walls. If we are to engage at all now, as well as working on the
project of imagining an alternative concept and practice of law for the
future, then something needs to be done even though we may compromise
our theory in the process. This is not to suggest either that we have no
agency, or that our agency will always lead to reproducing an oppressive
system. As we have tried to suggest, resistance may reproduce, but always
with a difference. It is this difference that may be exploited. As both
Angela Harris and Shane Phelan suggest in other contexts, we may have to
hold both modernist and postmodernist approaches to identity, both
essentialism and anti-essentialism, in tension.1 75 Our political action must
be fully cognizant of the risks that we take at the same time as we venture
into new territory.
Hopefully in this article we have given some indication of the
magnitude of the issues faced in attempting to reconcile the need for
practical political action with current theorizing on partial knowledge and
fragmented, constructed identities. In the legal arena the need for this
reconciliation is as intense as anywhere because of the very practical and
focused nature of feminist legal theory. We have, however, also attempted
to think through some of the practical possibilities of current theory, and
indicate some methods and values which we have found helpful in
attempting to negotiate this difficult terrain.
175. Harris, supra note 62; Phelan, supra note 129, at 768-69.
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